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The Glass Door: The Gender Composition of Newly-Hired 
Workers Across Hierarchical Job Levels
* 
 
This paper examines the gender composition of the flow of new hirees along the 
organizational hierarchy of jobs. We find that women have a reduced chance to be hired at 
higher hierarchical levels. We refer to this phenomenon as the “glass door”. The glass door 
consists of an absolute and a relative effect. First, there is a reduced probability of women 
being recruited for jobs at higher hierarchical levels. Second, a larger fraction of jobs below 
the focal level of hiring within the firm reduces the relative inflow of female hirees. The latter 
component leads women moving to firms in which the job has a lower relative position in the 
hierarchical structure. We explain the glass door phenomenon by a theoretical model of the 
firm’s decision to hire a woman. The model is based on two key assumptions. First, women 
have a higher probability of leaving due to their higher valuation of non-market activities. 
Second, a voluntary quit leads to a larger decrease in the production of lower level co-
workers when the worker who leaves has a position in the upper tier of the hierarchy. The 
glass door implies that the value of women’s outside option in the labor market is lower. It 
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1. Introduction 
In the last decade, many studies have addressed the possibility that female employees 
face a “glass ceiling” from their position in the labor market (e.g. Baxter and Wright, 
2000; Reskin and Padavic, 2002; Albrecht et al., 2003; Arulampalan et al. 2007; 
Bjerk, 2008). This paper describes and clarifies a novel and complementary 
phenomenon that we refer to as the “glass door.” While the glass ceiling pertains to 
careers of employees within organizations (or firms), the glass door focuses on newly-
hired workers. The glass ceiling is based on a hierarchy of job levels within firms, 
such that women have a smaller gain by a promotion to the higher layers within the 
firm, in terms of both its probability and the financial reward (Booth et al., 2003; Blau 
and DeVaro, 2007).
1 Similarly, the hierarchical job structures frame the glass door. 
Women are less likely to be hired externally in the upper tiers of the firm, and hence 
the value of the outside option is lower for female employees.
2 We argue that the 
glass door is the flip side of the glass ceiling of career opportunities that women may 
face from a within-firm perspective.
3  
This study relates gender differences in external hiring to the hierarchical 
structure of jobs.
4 For the glass door, we consider an absolute and a relative effect of 
the hierarchy. The absolute effect pertains to less women being hired at higher 
hierarchical levels. The relative effect pertains to jobs at a specific tier, having 
different importance across firms. Women are less likely to be hired when there are 
relatively many jobs below the level of the vacancy. Difference in importance of jobs 
at similar tiers across firms can be illustrated by a simple comparison of two two-tier 
firms. Both firms share tier 2, but firm A also has employees at tier 1 (the lowest 
level), and firm B includes jobs at tier 3. We claim that a job at tier 2 is more 
                                                
1 Studies have concentrated on the implications of gender differences in internal promotion as well as 
differences in the wage change upon promotion. Other empirical studies of the glass ceiling relate 
upper and lower deciles of the wage distribution to the existence of a glass ceiling and a sticky floor 
(Arulampalam et al., 2007; Kee, 2006). These differences are attributed to gender differences in 
internal promotion.  However, both internal and external hiring shape the wage distribution. 
2 We consider the features of the employer that hired the employee, but abstract from the features of the 
firm from which the employee separated. The actual transitions between firms have been found to be 
lower for women than for men (Loprest, 1992).  
3 So far, the term “glass door” has been used by Pendakur and Woodcock (2009) only. Our concept 
differs from theirs, in that they define the glass door as poor access to high-wage firms for immigrant 
workers.  
4 There are a few empirical studies of the gender composition of hiring at the firm level (Konrad and 
Pfeffer, 1991; Cohen et al., 1998). Bender et al. (2005) and Kirsten and Heywood (2007) investigated 
the hiring composition with respect to age. Their approach differs from the more widely investigated 
matching function, in which the hiring flow results from matches between job seekers and vacant job 
positions. Pissarides and Petrolongo (2001) provide an overview of this literature.   2 
important for the production process in firm A than in firm B, since in firm A there are 
more jobs below tier 2. Consequently, the external effects of a tier 2 job becoming 
vacant, in terms of lost production of the co-workers, will be the larger for firm A. 
The explanation of the absolute effect is based on the assumption that women 
have a higher propensity to quit, because of a higher valuation of non-market 
activities (Lazear and Rosen (1990)). The costs of a resignation are higher at a higher 
level, when there is a loss of the costs of initial training. Consequently, women are 
less likely to be hired at the higher levels. The relative effect can be motivated by the 
dependence between jobs within a firm. It is in line with recent studies on various 
forms of interdependence among co-workers within firms, such as peer effects (Mas 
and Moretti, 2009), spans of control (Fox, 2009), and other social connections among 
workers (Bandiera et al., 2009). In our study, we focus specifically on the loss of 
production of the co-workers in case a worker quits. This loss of production may be 
considered as an external effect that is costly to the firm. Studies on labor demand 
usually relate external hiring to the cost of dismissal. In our study, external hiring is 
related to the cost of quitting. We assume that the external effects on the co-workers 
are higher at the higher tiers. When the job has a larger fraction of jobs at the tiers 
below, the ensuing costs will be larger, making it less likely that females are hired. 
Hierarchies can be made comparable across firms if all of the jobs of the entire 
labor market can be classified into broadly defined hierarchical levels. At a higher 
tier, a job contains more attributes, so that employees must be more skilled to perform 
the job. The jobs together form a ladder. We based our interfirm comparison of 
hierarchies on a uniform classification of hierarchical job levels across organizations. 
A firm offers an array of jobs to its workers. Each job consists of a bundle of tasks 
and responsibilities that a worker needs to fulfill. The jobs within the firm can be 
ranked by level of complexity, ranging from simple, repetitive routines to complex, 
non-recurrent tasks. Following Lazear and Oyer (2004), we used job complexity as a 
measure to construct a hierarchy of jobs within a firm. Each additional level of 
complexity results in a higher hierarchical level. Job complexity had been measured 
uniformly across firms in our data set of Dutch firms. It enabled us to make a coherent   3 
interfirm comparison of hierarchies.
5 Between firms, we found a surprising 
heterogeneity of the fraction of jobs below a specific job level. 
  The glass door phenomenon of external hiring has two features that were 
unexplored so far. First, it provides an additional reason for the gender difference in 
the value of the outside option. Recent studies have identified the specific features of 
organizations in the external labor market that reduce the value of the outside option 
of female employees.
6 Women were found to have a weaker response to merit pay 
schemes,
7 and to have more limited networks for informal job search.
8 Females are 
also more likely to be employed by female business owners or female supervisors.
9 
Second, the glass door may provide an additional explanation of why a glass 
ceiling is sustainable as an equilibrium phenomenon. Household-related factors were 
found to be a source of equilibrium for the glass ceiling. Women have a higher ability 
in non-market activities (Lazear and Rosen, 1990), and they are less flexible when the 
family needs to move as a result of a job offer (Booth et al., 2003). We claim that the 
more limited opportunities of females in the external labor market may reinforce the 
glass ceiling. A more limited scope of outside opportunities gives women a lower 
alternative wage, which results in a downward effect on their current pay (McCue, 
1996; Manning and Swaffield, 2008; Barth and Dale-Olsen, 2009).  
  The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explores the relationship 
between the hierarchy and the gender composition of hiring. Section 3 describes the 
data we used for our empirical analysis. Section 4 details the empirical model, and 
Section 5 presents its estimates. Section 6 concludes. 
                                                
5 Interfirm comparisons of hierarchies are relatively scarce. Recent studies are e.g. Ortín-Ángel and 
Salas-Fumás (2002) and Pekkarinen and Vartiainen (2006). The latter study has measured job 
complexity across firms, although it did not interpret this measure in terms of hierarchies. There are 
relatively more case studies of single firms that investigate the hierarchical structure of the work force 
(e.g. Baker et al., 1994; Audas et al., 2004). 
6 To our knowledge, only Mortensen (2003) estimated the value of the outside option directly, although 
he did not distinguish between men and women. He considered the difference between the earnings 
distribution (the distribution of wage earned by workers currently in employment) and the wage offer 
distribution (the wage distribution of the workers hired from non employment) to infer the degree of 
monopsony power enjoyed by firms. 
7 It was demonstrated that women fare less in competitive environments when they compete against 
male counterparts (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2003; Price, 2008), and that women are less attracted to 
variable pay schemes (Dohmen and Falk, 2006).  
8 Women participate in narrower social networks that employers may use to find new hirees through 
informal search (Goos and Salomons, 2007). In other words, women’s social networks are richer of 
strong ties, but less effective in generating job offers than men’s networks (Granovetter 1995). 
9 It was found that women are relatively more employed with firms that have a female business owner 
(Carrington and Troske, 1995) or with firms that are managed by female supervisors (Carrington and 
Troske, 1998; Cardoso and Winter-Ebmer, 2007). Women have a higher job satisfaction when they 
have relatively more female colleagues (Bender et al., 2005).   4 
2. Theoretical framework 
2.1 Main assumptions 
The model is based on two main assumptions. Assumption 1: men and women have 
equal ability distributions in the labor market, but women have better non-market 
activities. The consequence of this assumption is that women are more likely to quit. 
Lazear and Rosen (1990) introduced this assumption to explain differences in 
promotion between men and women. This assumption was further applied by Booth et 
al. (2003) and Pekkarinen and Vertiainen (2006) amongst others. Various empirical 
studies have addressed this assumption. Thus, Sicherman (1996) found for a US firm 
that quit rates of women are higher shortly after hiring, but that the difference 
becomes smaller as time on the job lengthens. Women are more inclined to quit for 
non-market-related reasons. Theodossiou and Zangelis (2009) showed for six 
European countries that men have higher job-to-job transitions, whereas women are 
more likely to exit to non-employment. They confirmed the finding of Hersch and 
Stratton (1997) that women are more inclined to quit for family related reasons. 
  Our second assumption concerns the consequences of a resignation for a firm 
in terms of lost production at various tiers. Assumption 2: the costs of a vacancy are 
higher at the upper tiers of a hierarchy. It can be motivated as follows. A vacancy 
leads to a costly reduction of production of the co-workers. It gives a temporal 
reduction in the output of other employees when production is organized in teams. 
Furthermore, there will be less monitoring of the workers who were supervised by the 
worker who left the firm. In this respect, the financial loss tends to be higher with a 
vacancy in the upper tier, because these vacancies usually take more time to fill 
(Barron et al., 1997; Russo et al., 2000). Consequently, potential disruptive effects of 
a resignation in terms of lost production will be larger at the upper levels. 
2.2 Hierarchical effects 
We consider hiring as an employer’s job assignment mechanism. Basic to our model 
is that a firm has a vacant job with specific characteristics, for which it needs to 
recruit an applicant be it female or male. The position of the vacant job in the firm’s 
hierarchy is known upon hiring as the level of ability the job requires. The firm also 
needs to take into account of the dependence between jobs within the firm, as 
reflected by the hierarchy. Our model of the gender composition of external hiring 
across job levels is based on Lazear and Rosen (1990), with the main difference that 
our model does not allow for promotion. We consider two periods after hiring, during   5 
which the worker performs different activities. We abstract from time discounting. In 
the first period, the workers get costly firm-specific training. During this period of 
training, workers are less productive, but this loss is offset by an increase in 
productivity in period 2. As a result, training leads to a higher increase in productivity 
of more able workers. 
1 1 * q δ γ =   period 1 
2 2 * q δ γ =   period 2 
with 1 2 1 γ γ < < , and  1 q  and  2 q  referring to the worker’s productivity in period 1 and 2, 
respectively. δ  reflects ability. Workers may quit the firm in period 2. Let a woman, 
man, and the co-workers be denoted by the superscripts F, M, and CW, respectively. 
A worker resigns with a probability P  in period 2. A resignation has the following 
two effects. First, it leads to a direct loss of production of the worker who resigned in 
period 2. Second, there will be external effects within the work force, since there is a 
temporary loss of productivity of the co-workers, which is referred to by 
CW q .  
Upon hiring, a firm is indifferent as to hire a woman or a man when their total 
expected production over both periods are equal: 
(1)  1 2 1 2 * (1 )* * * * (1 )* * *
F F F F CW M M M M CW P P q P P q δ γ δ γ δ γ δ γ + − − = + − −  
Thus, a resignation in period 2 leads to a decrease in production of  2 * *
j j P δ γ  
( , j F M = ), and to temporal decrease in the co-workers’ production of  *
j CW P q . 




* * (1 )* * *
(1 )*
M F CW M M M CW
F
F
P q P P q
P
δ γ δ γ
δ
γ γ




Due to better non-market opportunities, women are assumed to have a higher 
probability of resigning ( ),
F M P P >  so that 
F M δ δ > . Thus, at equal job level, the 
female hirees have a higher ability than the male hirees. Consequently, women are 
less likely to be hired at a higher absolute hierarchical level.  
Moreover, since  ,
F M P P >  we can infer from equation (2) that 
/ 0.
F CW q δ ∂ ∂ >  In other words, females must have a higher ability to compensate for 
the co-workers’ loss of production that results from their larger expected probability 
of resignation. The loss will be larger at a higher relative hierarchical position in the   6 
firm (assumption 2). Consequently, fewer women will be hired when there are many 
jobs below the focal level of hiring within the firm. 
Overall, the fact that women are more likely to quit after training renders two 
predictions with respect to the gender composition of the flow of hirees. Let the hiring 
composition be characterized as  
(3)   ( , ) F g J J = ￿   
where F is an indicator for hiring a female worker and J refers to the hierarchical level 
of the job ladder, with level 1 being the lowest tier. The first prediction is that there is 
an absolute effect,  / 0 F J ∂ ∂ < , as firms want to recruit a woman of higher ability at 
equal job level, in order to compensate for the direct loss of expensive training that 
results from a quit. Second, there is a relative effect,  / 0 F J ∂ ∂ < ￿ , since resigning from 
an upper level job induces a larger loss to the firm’s production. The absolute and 
relative effect together will be referred to as the glass door. 
2.3 Implications  
The glass door contributes to gender differences in both the value of the outside 
option and the revenue of internal promotion. The value of the outside option results 
from the distribution of possible wage offers by other employers in the external labor 
market. It is denoted by the density function g(w), where w is the worker’s wage. A 
worker stays with his current employer as long as the wage is larger than the value of 
the outside option in the labor market. The outside option equals the maximum wage 
of all possible offers in the outside labor market. 
  max ( ) w w w g w > ≡ ￿  
The glass door concerns the reduced probability of hiring a woman at higher 
values of J and  J ￿ . The wage w depends on specific values of J and  J ￿ , and Fox 
(2009) has demonstrated that w is increasing in both arguments. The reduced access 
of women to the jobs associated with the higher values of J and J ￿  leads to a gender 
difference in the outside option in the external labor market. Women have a more 
limited access to the higher tier jobs, so that they benefit less from the higher wages 
associated with these tiers. As a consequence of the glass door, the cumulative 
function of the outside option in the labor market for women is dominated by that of 
men: 
(4)  ( ) ( )
F M G w G w < ,   7 
  Next, we consider how gender differences in the outside option may affect the 
revenue of internal promotion, which depends on the probability of promotion and the 
wage increase upon promotion. Overall, it is smaller for women: 
(5)  Pr( 1| 1)* ( 1, 1) Pr( 1| 0)* ( 0, 1) im F w F im im F w F im = = ∆ = = < = = ∆ = =  
where im is an indicator for internal promotion and  w ∆  is the wage change upon 
promotion. However,  w ∆  is such that  1 t w +  exceeds  1 t w + ￿ , the value of the outside 
option. Because of (4), we argue that a reduced outside opportunity of women in the 
labor market gives them a lower revenue of internal promotion.    
3. Data 
We used the AVO data set for our empirical analysis. This data set was 
compiled by the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (Venema and 
Faas, 1999) from administrative records of employees of Dutch organizations from all 
economic sectors. Organizations and employees were sampled in a two-stage 
sampling process. In the first stage, the sampling probability of organizations was 
negatively related to their size. In the second stage, employees were sampled, with 
their probability of being sampled negatively related to firm size. We used two waves 
of the data set. In the first wave, information on workers of both October 1997 and 
October 1998 was registered (for workers who were employed with the firm over this 
period). For the employees who were hired (separated) during this period, the 
individual information pertains to October 1998 (1997) only. The second wave, with 
the same structure, concerns October 1999 and October 2000. Our selected sample 
consists of 15,422 hirees from 1,711 firms.
10 348 firms were observed in both waves. 
Moreover, we applied a selected sample of 9,522 hirees (1,437 firms) who were 
employed with another employer before hiring.  
<Table 1 about here> 
Table 1 shows that the fraction of female incumbents
11 before hiring at t-1 is 
positively related to the fraction of female new hirees between t-1 and t. About 34 
percent of the new hirees are females. Firms with a fraction of incumbents between 0 
                                                
10 We applied the following additional selection criteria. Entire sample: (wave 1) 48,939 employees, 
1,857 firms; (wave 2) 52,385 employees, 1,838 firms. Selection of firms that have at least 10 
employees: (wave 1) 45,702 employees, 1,145 firms; (wave 2) 49,302 employees, 1,184 firms. 
Selection of new hirees: (wave 1) 8,139 employees, 1,107 firms; (wave 2) 7,841 employees, 1,111 
firms. No item non-response of incumbents at beginning of period: (wave 1) 7,999 employees, 1,102 
firms; (wave 2) 7,768 employees, 1,108 firms. Each firms has at least two new hirees in either period: 
(wave 1) 7,937 employees, 1,040 firms; (wave 2) 7,680 employees, 1,020 firms. 
11 In our empirical analysis, incumbents at t-1 do not include the employees who were going to leave 
the firm between t-1 and t.   8 
and 10 percent have on average 17 percent female hirees, which is to increase to 82 
percent for firms with 90 – 100 percent of female incumbents. At the level of the firm, 
23 percent (8 percent) of the firms have no female (no male) incumbents; the average 
fraction of females is 0.38 (median: 0.33); 25 percent of the firms have a fraction of 
females above 0.62. Evidently, the fraction of women is skewed to the left at the firm 
level.  
<Tables 2 and 3 about here> 
Table 2 gives the definitions of all nine job levels that were used for all firms 
of the sample. Corresponding to the level of complexity, we constructed seven tiers.
12 
Table 3 gives the distribution of the hirees across the seven tiers for men and women 
separately. The table shows that women are hired externally at lower levels of the 
labor market. The first two columns include all new hirees, whereas the latter columns 
are based on the selection of job-to-job movers. Females are more likely to be hired in 
the lowest tiers 1 to 3, whereas males are more likely to be hired in tiers 4, 6, and 7. 
There is no difference in hiring for tier 5. The first two columns show that about 95 
percent of the new hirees enter the firm up to and including tier 6. A comparison 
between the previously-employed hirees (last two columns) and all hirees (first 
columns) shows that job movers are less likely to be hired in tiers 1 and 2. About 14 
percent (8 percent) of the female (male) job movers enroll tiers 1 and 2, whereas for 
all female (male) hirees it is 27 percent (18 percent).  
<Table 4 about here> 
Table 4 gives the distribution of the job levels across the different hierarchical 
structures for the incumbent workers. It shows that firms are very heterogeneous with 
respect to the lowest and highest tier. The lowest tier of the hierarchy is on the 
horizontal axis of the table; the vertical axis gives the highest tier. The table 
distinguishes all different combinations of the lowest tier and the upper tier for all 
firms of the sample. About 1 percent of the firms have 1 as lowest tier and 4 as upper 
tier, whereas about 5 percent of the firms have 4 and 7 as the lower and upper tier, 
respectively. The modus of all possible combinations are the combinations of tiers (3, 
6) and (3, 7), with each 13 percent of the firms. A small proportion of the firms (2 
percent) have the upper and lower tier at equal level. For each of the combinations, 
the table gives the average fraction of job levels (J ) between the lower to the upper 
                                                
12 We did not include job level 9, since this job level was absent in the sample of hirees. Levels 7 and 8 
are grouped into one category.   9 
tier. Thus for the combination of tiers 1 and 2, tier 1 has on average 64 percent of the 
jobs, and tier 2 has 36 percent of the jobs.
13  
<Table 5 about here> 
Table 5 gives the gender distribution of the newly-hired workers across the 
tiers for each combination of upper and lower tier.
14 We refer to the lowest tier as l 
and the highest tier as u, and consider a change of F  with respect to an increase of l, 
keeping u constant or with respect to a change of u, keeping l constant. A job at level 
k is more important at the k-th tier of the combination (l, u) than at the k-th tier of the 
combination (l+1, u). For all entries of Table 5, we checked the direction of the 
change of F while moving from (l, u) to (l+1, u). For 41 out of 54 changes there 
appears to be a decrease of F . Weighting the entries of the table does not change the 
conclusion: Women appear to be hired externally by firms where the tier is less 
important, ceteris paribus on the focal layer of hiring.
15  
4. Empirical model 
The firm’s decision to hire a female applicant is explained by observed characteristics 
of the work force, the firm, and the individual job, and by the job’s hierarchical 
position. Hence, we reformulate equation (3) as 
(6)  1 ' ' ' ' it ijt i ijt ijt i ijt F Z W X H ζ ϕ γ η α ε − = + + + + +         
1,..., ; 1,..., ; 1999,2001 i i M j N t = = =  
Subscripts i, j, and t refer to the i-th firm, the j-th hiree, and year t, respectively. There 
are M firms and the i-th firm hires i N  employees. The dependent variable F is an 
indicator for hiring a female worker.
16 It is a flow variable as hiring takes place 
between t-1 and t.  
The work force averages,  1 ijt Z − , are time-varying stock variables. They are 
allowed to change from year to year, as the composition of the work force may 
                                                
13 In individual firms there may be tiers with zero jobs between the upper and lower tier. 
14 The only difference is that in some firms workers are hired either below the lowest level of the 
incumbents or above the highest level of the incumbents. 
15 An unreported table for  F  in the incumbents at t-1 leads to the same conclusions.  
16 In doing so, we follow the literature in neglecting the impact of the gender composition of the pool of 
applicants on the probability of hiring a woman. The only exception we know is Holzer (1996). The 
neglect of the gender composition of the pool of applicants is not likely to have consequences in our 
particular case, since a study on the recruitment procedures of Dutch firms using a large sample of 
vacancies over the period 1991 – 1998 shows that the gender composition of the hired applicants tends 
to mirror the gender composition in the pools of applicants (Van Ommeren et al., 2005, Russo and Van 
Ommeren, 2009).   10 
change. The work-force averages refer to the start of the period of hiring (t-1), and 
they exclude information about employees who left the firm between t-1 and t. In this 
way, there are no disturbing effects of hiring employees who may share some of the 
observed characteristics of the employees who separated.
17  i W  is a vector of time-
invariant firm-specific variables.  ijt X  is a vector of variables that refer to the 
attributes of the job. We apply the labor demand assumption that the firm determines 
the job attributes and the individual hierarchical level prior to posting the vacancy. 
These characteristics do not change upon hiring, that is the attributes of the vacant job 
do not change because of an unforeseen supply of specific skills of applicants.
18  ijt H  
refers to the hierarchical position of the hiree. ζ , ϕ , γ , and η are vectors of 
parameters. Equation (4) is estimated by two estimators that differ in their 
assumptions about the firm-specific random error term  i α . First, the Linear 
Probability Model (LPM) with Newey-West clustered standard errors allows for 
dependence between  i α  and the other time-variant explanatory variables. The effect 
of  1 ijt Z −  can be identified in this specification, since in our sample 348 panel firms are 
observed in both waves. The second estimator is a random-effect probit. It is based on 
the assumption that  i α  is independent of all explanatory variables and the 
idiosyncratic error term  ijt ε .  
We next discuss the explanatory variables of equation (6) in greater detail. The 
vector Z  contains the fraction of female incumbents that picks up a so-called 
persistency effect
19 and the fraction of non-native incumbents. It also includes the 
averages of tenure (for women, non-natives, and all incumbents) that correct for 
gender differences in job turnover in the labor market. Furthermore, it has the 
logarithm of the contractual number of hours, the actual number of hours (relative to 
the contractual number of hours), and the logarithm of the hourly wage. Finally, Z  
includes the average fractions of the following categorial variables: age (4 categories), 
education (7 categories), job occupation (7 categories), pay scheme (9 categories), and 
                                                
17 In the Netherlands, about 65 percent of the flow of new hirees can be attributed to rehiring for an 
existing job (see Hamermesh et al. (1996)). 
18 Accordingly, we included only job-related variables of the hiree. To avoid endogeneity, 
characteristics of the hiree, such as age, education, and wage, were not included.  
19 The persistency effect implies that the gender composition of the external hirees mirrors the gender 
structure of the incumbents. In other words, the probability of hiring a female applicant depends on the 
fraction of female incumbents.   11 
firm size (5 categories).
20 The vector W contains the remaining variables at the firm 
level, that is 4 indicators for the type of working agreement, and 13 indicators for 
economic sector. The vector X has 7 occupational indicators for the hiree and 8 
indicators for individual pay components the hiree may receive.
21  
The vector H has two hierarchical variables. First,
k
ijt J  (k=1,…,K) is an 
indicator for the k-th hierarchical level at which the employee is hired. Subscript k 
refers to the k-th hierarchical level. We define 1 and K as the lowest and highest 
hierarchical level in the labor market, respectively, although in individual firms the 
lowest and highest level may be anywhere between 1 and K (see Table 4). H also 
contains a variable that measures the relative number of jobs below. We 
introduce 1
k
it J − , which is the fraction of jobs at the k-th level relative to the total 
number of jobs within the firm at t-1. The relative position in the hierarchy is 
measured by  1
k





1 1 1 1 ...
k k
it it it it J J J J
−
− − − − ≡ + + + ￿  
Overall, both hierarchical variables pick up the effects of the variables in equation (3).  
The existence of a glass door implies that both 
k
ijt J  and  1
k
it J − ￿  have a negative effect on 
F. 
<Table 6 about here> 
5. Estimates 
We estimated equation (6) with a LPM specification. See column 1 of Table 6. 
With respect to the main variables, the results are as follows. The job level has a 
negative influence on the probability of hiring a female applicant; the difference 
between the lowest and highest tier is about 28 percentage points. The estimated 
coefficient on
k
i J ￿  equals –0.067, ceteris paribus on the other explanatory variables, 
                                                
20 We consider the fractions of the incumbents receiving the following pay components: personal 
bonus, tariffs and provisions, shift allowance, inconvenience allowance, overtime, wage in kind, extra 
payment, profit sharing, and other extra payments. The latter three components are low-powered group 
incentives and all of the other components are worker specific. 
21 We excluded an indicator of individual overtime payment. 
22 Apparently, 
1 0. i J = ￿  
23 We also experimented with the fraction of jobs below the level of hiring (
k
i J ￿ ) relative to the fraction 
of incumbents at level k (
k
J ), but it gave an insignificant coefficient.   12 
including the individual job level.
24 So, the probability of hiring a female worker 
decreases with 0.67 percentage points when the relative fraction of jobs below the 
vacant job increases with 10 percentage points. 
All of the work-force characteristics are (jointly) statistically insignificant, 
except for relative hours, the log of the wage, and the pay components. The job 
characteristics of the hiree are jointly significant. The effects of the individual 
occupation are very substantial. The maximum difference is between administrative 
occupations and technical occupations. The probability of hiring a woman is about 47 
percentage points higher for occupations in the former category. The probability of 
hiring a woman is 11 percentage points lower, if the individual pay has a bonus 
component; a shift allowance leads to a decrease of 3.4 percentage points; an 
inconvenience allowance leads to a decrease of 13.3 percentage points. Women are 
more likely (5.7 percentage point) to be hired if workers receive extra payment for 
collective agreements.
25 
Next, we consider the random effects probit estimate (Table 6, column 2) and 
we compare it with the estimate of column 1. It shows that the marginal effects of the 
job level variables hardly change. The marginal effect of 
k
i J ￿  becomes –0.135, which 
cannot be statistically distinguished from the fixed effect estimate.
26 The workforce 
variables tend to have a more substantial impact on the gender hiring in the random-
effects specification. The most striking difference is the average fraction of women, 
which has an estimated marginal effect of 0.546 according to the random-effects 
specification.
27  
<Table 7 about here> 
We performed various robustness checks. First, we re-estimated both 
specifications for a selection of external hirees who were previously employed 
elsewhere, since Table 3 indicates that this group is generally hired at higher tiers. See 
                                                
24 Less than 2 percent of the predicted dependent variable is outside the 0-1 interval. 
25 This is an agreement that holds for most of the workers inside a firm. The estimates give conflicting 
results for this variable. However, omitting this variable has no effect on the conclusions.  
26 The estimated coefficients of a LPM with random firm-specific error terms and Newey-West 
clustered standard errors give an estimated coefficient on 
k
i J ￿  of –0.117 (0.025). Also for the other 
probit estimates presented in Tables 6, 7, and 8, the differences between both estimates are minor. A 
Hausman test on the LPM-specification favors the fixed-effects specification. 
27 The firm-specific fixed-effects estimates hardly change when omitting Woman . We also estimated a 
specification in which we substituted  1
k
it J − ￿  by 6 fractions  1
k
it J −  (k=2,…,7). The fixed effects estimate 
indicates that they are jointly significant at the 10-percent level (p-value: 0.058); the random effect 
estimate yields joint significance at the 5-percent level (p-value: 0.014).   13 
Columns 3 and 4. There are no substantial differences with the estimates of the entire 
sample of hirees.  
As a second robustness check, we allowed for a different impact of the relative 
number of jobs below the vacant job, for each of the seven tiers. Any difference may 
indicate that the relative hierarchical effect differs across the layers. See Table 7, 
columns 1 and 3. The fixed effects estimates yield no jointly significant effect of  1
k
it J − ￿  
for the tiers jointly, although it seems to be individually significant for the third layer. 
The random effects estimates indicate that  1
k
it J − ￿  is jointly significant for the six layers. 
The marginal effects are smallest in the lowest tiers, indicating that the relative 
hierarchical effect pertains to the upper part of the hierarchy. 
As a third robustness check, we classified the firms according to the highest 
tier, since the fraction of jobs below the level of hiring may be related to the highest 
tier. It may lead to a different effect for each of the different classes of firms. The 
fixed-effect estimate (Table 7, column 2) does not indicate a joint significant 
influence, whereas the random effect estimate (column 4) implies that the effect of 
1
k
it J − ￿  varies with the upper tier. In firms with an upper tier up to 3, there is no 
indication of any relative effect, in contrast to the firms with an upper tier of 4 or 
more. Again, the result suggests that the relative hierarchical effect is related to the 
upper part of the hierarchy. 
Fourth, we considered the effects of the relative number of jobs at the same 
tier and above, by re-estimating the regressions of Tables 6 and 7 for  1 (1 ).
k
it J − − ￿  Of 
course, the estimates of Table 6 did not change, except for the sign of the effect of the 
job mass variable. Also, our conclusions about the effects of Table 7 remain 
unchanged.  
Finally, we re-estimated all specifications for a group of hirees who were hired 
for a full-time job. We did so to refute the argument that the glass door exists because 
women are more likely to have a part-time job, and part-time jobs are scarcer in the 
upper tiers of a hierarchy. Our conclusion about the existence of a glass door also 
holds for the group of full-time workers. We selected 7,672 external hirees (1,020 
firms) who were employed for at least 32 hours per week. The job level has a negative 
effect on the probability to hire a woman. The estimated coefficient on 
k
i J ￿  becomes –  14 
0.077 (0.042) for the fixed effect specification and for the random-effect specification 
the marginal effect becomes –0.199 (0.044). 
6. Conclusions  
The main finding of his study is that women are less likely to be hired at 
higher job levels. In addition, after controlling for the individual job level of hiring, a 
larger fraction of jobs within the firm below the focal level of hiring decreases the 
probability of hiring a woman. It points to a particular type of sorting in the labor 
market: Women are more likely to be hired by firms for a job with a lower relative 
position in the firm’s hierarchy. As a consequence, women have a lower value of the 
alternative wage in the outside labor market. It may induce a gender wage gap, since 
workers in higher hierarchical positions get better paid (Fox, 2009). Our results are in 
line with findings in recent studies on the gender wage gap across the wage 
distribution (e.g. Arulampalam et al., 2006; Meyersson Milgrom and Petersen, 2008).  
What makes the glass door different from the glass ceiling? The glass ceiling 
refers to gender differences in internal promotion, whereas the glass door is about 
gender differences in external hiring. Both phenomena build upon the assumption of 
females having a higher value of non-market activities. However, external hiring 
dominates internal promotion for most of the firms (e.g. for the Netherlands, 
Hamermesh et al., 1996). An interesting implication of the glass door is that it may 
reinforce the glass ceiling, so that the glass ceiling can be sustainable as an 
equilibrium phenomenon. 
This study opens new avenues of further research. First, this study shows that 
hierarchies are extremely heterogeneous across firms, using a coherent interfirm 
measure of jobs. We classified the organizations’ hierarchy on the basis of two 
criteria: 1. the span of layers (that is, the lowest and highest level of job present in the 
organization) and 2. the structure of the hierarchy (that is, the relative abundance of 
jobs at any given level of job complexity). Firms were found to be heterogeneous for 
both criteria. This is a remarkable finding, as most studies focus on a single hierarchy 
of a representative firm, so that any differences across organizations remained 
unnoticed. These studies consider a hierarchy as a tournament inducing extra effort of 
the employees (Lazear and Rosen, 1982). Alternatively, it was modeled as an 
assignment mechanism relating the worker’s ability to the job’s span of control 
(Ortín-Ángel and Salas-Fumás, 2002). Even the Internal Labor Market theory (Lazear   15 
and Oyer, 2004) has so far remained silent about differences in hierarchies across 
firms.   
Second, this study gives a different perspective on the wage distribution. 
Usually, gender differences in wage are related to (unobservable) characteristics of 
the worker and the firm. The implication of this study is that the gender differences in 
the current wage may be due to differences in opportunities in the external labor 
market, which in turn are related to differences in hierarchical structures across firms.  
Third, our analysis of the glass door phenomenon suggests that the glass 
ceiling could be quite low. In fact, the glass door is present already at low level 
positions, so that they can sustain a glass ceiling at a relatively low level in the 
organizational hierarchy of jobs. The implication is that the concept of the glass 
ceiling, originally introduced to explain the paucity of women in managerial positions 
(positions quite high in the organizational hierarchy), could be extended to cover jobs 
at a lower level.    16 
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Table 1 – Average of female hirees (F) by class of female incumbents 
Fraction of female 





0  0.15  (0.36)  1,245 
0 – 0.1  0.17  (0.38)  2,358 
0.1 - 0.2  0.26  (0.44)  2,644 
0.2 - 0.3  0.34  (0.47)  1,966 
0.3 - 0.4  0.41  (0.49)  1,620 
0.4 - 0.5  0.44  (0.50)  1,347 
0.5 - 0.6  0.56  (0.50)  841 
0.6 - 0.7  0.58  (0.49)  1,124 
0.7 - 0.8  0.68  (0.47)  820 
0.8 - 0.9  0.74  (0.44)  741 
0.9 - 0.1  0.82  (0.37)  440 
1.0  0.79  (0.41)  276 
     
All firms  0.34  (0.28)  15,422 
a)  Observed at t-1.  
b)  Indicator F for hiring of female applicant. Average of F over all hirees and all firms 
within the specific class of female incumbents. New hirees observed between t-1 and 
t. 
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Table 2 – Definition of job level 
Job level  Description 
1  Very simple and repeated tasks, which do not require any particular 
education or experience, and are carried out under direct 
supervision. 
2  Simple and repeated tasks, which require some basic administrative 
or technical knowledge or some working experience. Some 




Less simple tasks, of a repetitive nature, which require low 
administrative or technical knowledge or some working experience. 
The tasks involve a degree of autonomy. 
4  Less simple tasks, of different natures, which require low 
administrative or technical knowledge with completed vocational 
education in a given technique or profession. The tasks involve a 
degree of autonomy. 
5  Difficult tasks, of many different natures, which require an 
intermediate level of administrative or technical knowledge and a 
high level of autonomy. 
6  Composite tasks within an occupation, which require a high level of 
administrative or technical knowledge and a high level of 
autonomy. 
7  Directive and managerial tasks, which require analytical, creative 
and personal communication skills. Tasks carried out on the basis of 
autonomous decision-making and require an academic education. 
8  Management of mid-size firms and participation in the strategic 
decision-making. 
9  Management of large firms and participation in the strategic 
decision-making. 
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Table 3 – New hirees across job level by gender
a) 
Job level  All new hirees
 b)  New hirees, 
previously employed 
  Male  Female  Male  Female 

























































observations  9,532  6,085  6,352  3,347 
a)  Standard error of mean in parentheses. 




Table 4 – Fraction of jobs by hierarchy at t-1; Selection of incumbent workers
a) 





1  2  3  4  5  6 
    J   % firms  J   % firms  J   %firms  J   % firms  J   %firms  J   % firms 
1  1  1.00  0.1   
1  0.64   
2 





1  0.36   
2  0.38  0.69 
 
3 







1  0.24   
2  0.23  0.36 
 
3  0.32  0.36  0.42 
 
4 









1  0.24   
2  0.17  0.27 
 
3  0.20  0.34  0.38 
 
4  0.20  0.20  0.32  0.67 
 
5 











1  0.14   
2  0.15  0.19 
 
3  0.18  0.23  0.27 
 
4  0.19  0.23  0.23  0.35 
 
5  0.23  0.22  0.33  0.44  0.52 
 
6 












1  0.09   
2  0.09  0.11 
 
3  0.15  0.20  0.16 
 
4  0.20  0.19  0.21  0.19 
 
5  0.26  0.28  0.31  0.39  0.36 
 
6  0.16  0.15  0.22  0.29  0.48  0.83 
7 












a) One organization with lowest and highest level of 7 is not included.  J  is the fraction of jobs at a 
specific layer.   24 
Table 5 – Fraction of female hirees (F ) by position in hierarchy
a) 





1  2  3  4  5  6 
    F   F   F   F   F   F  
1  1  0.67 
1  0.75 
 
2 
2  0.64  0.42 
1  0.45   
2  0.59  0.54 
 
3 
3  0.33  0.54  0.45 
1  0.60   
2  0.58  0.52 
 
3  0.50  0.34  0.23 
 
4 
4  0.52  0.17  0.14  0.27 
1  0.59   
2  0.40  0.55 
 
3  0.49  0.38  0.40 
 
4  0.32  0.29  0.23  0.06 
 
5 
5  0.27  0.16  0.25  0.28  0.41 
1  0.61   
2  0.47  0.45 
 
3  0.54  0.42  0.36 
 
4  0.42  0.29  0.28  0.26 
 
5  0.48  0.36  0.26  0.28  0.44 
 
6 
6  0.38  0.25  0.22  0.22  0.20  0.00 
1  0.36   
2  0.47  0.37 
 
3  0.53  0.47  0.44 
 
4  0.45  0.40  0.33  0.31 
 
5  0.55  0.42  0.40  0.32  0.51 
 
6  0.43  0.30  0.28  0.23  0.30  0.22 
7 
7  0.38  0.31  0.29  0.25  0.40  0.00 
a) Highest and lowest layer refer to the distribution of the incumbents at t-1. New hirees are observed 
between t-1 and t.    25 
Table 6 – Estimates of equation (6); dependent variable: Indicator female hiree
a) 














Job mass below, 
k J ￿  c)  -0.067  (0.031)
**  -0.135 (0.030)
***  -0.070 (0.035)
**  -0.156 (0.034)
*** 
Characteristics of work 
force
c) 
       
Woman   -0.096 (0.059)  0.546 (0.037)
***  -0.069 (0.063)  0.491 (0.042)
*** 
Nonnative   0.092 (0.081)  0.062 (0.061)  0.078 (0.106)  0.075 (0.069) 
Tenure woman  -0.002 (0.001)  -0.004 (0.002)
**  -0.002 (0.002)  -0.005 (0.002)
*** 
Tenure nonnative   -0.002 (0.002)  -0.002 (0.003)  -0.002 (0.003)  0.0002 (0.004) 
Tenure   0.003 (0.002)  0.002 (0.002)  0.007 (0.003)
**  0.004 (0.002)
* 
log( ) hours   0.272 (0.136)  -0.005 (0.087)  0.120 (0.143)  -0.050 (0.105) 
relativehours   -0.618 (0.315)
**  -0.055 (0.193)  -0.155 (0.350)  0.037 (0.230) 
log( ) wage   -0.023 (0.026)
**  0.018 (0.028)  -0.010 (0.038)  -0.021 (0.035) 
Fractions age (4)   1.70  1.33  2.09
*  2.33 
Fractions  Education (7)   1.65  12.23
*  1.67  8.94 









Characteristics of firm     
Indicators working 
agreement  (4)  -  6.35  -  3.23 
Indicators economic sector 
(13)   -  336
***  -  211
*** 
Indicators firm size (5)   1.35  10.46
*  0.70  4.85 
Characteristics of job of 
hiree 
   
Indicators individual  
job level
  d)  (6)   10.91
***  112
***  7.94
***  74.80 
       J2  -0.047 (0.031)  -0.046 (0.023)
**  -0.045 (0.063)  -0.026 (0.043) 
       J3  -0.059 (0.032)
**  -0.075 (0.023)
***  -0.096 (0.061)  -0.099 (0.039)
** 
       J4  -0.151 (0.034)
***  -0.181 (0.022)
***  -0.173 (0.063)
***  -0.183 (0.034)
*** 
       J5  -0.197 (0.039)
***  -0.213 (0.024)
***  -0.224 (0.066)
***  -0.216 (0.037)
*** 
       J6  -0.272 (0.047)
***  -0.243 (0.024)
***  -0.309 (0.072)
***  -0.236 (0.031)
*** 
       J7
 e)  -0.279 (0.055)
***  -0.232 (0.028)
***  -0.339 (0.078)









     Administrative    0.474 (0.015)
***  0.589 (0.013)
***  0.473 (0.017)
***  0.620 (0.017)
*** 
     IT  0.076 (0.025)
***  0.125 (0.038)
***  0.089 (0.031)
***  0.165 (0.045)
*** 
     Commercial  0.281 (0.022)
***  0.415 (0.019)
***  0.282 (0.023)
***  0.443 (0.025)
*** 
     Care  0.258 (0.017)
***  0.342 (0.016)
***  0.262 (0.019)
***  0.373 (0.021)
*** 
     Creative  0.216 (0.032)
***  0.372 (0.034)
***  0.218 (0.039)
***  0.410 (0.041)
*** 
     Executive  0.127 (0.020)
***  0.169 (0.034)
***  0.150 (0.022)
***  0.225 (0.037)
*** 
     Unknown  0.218 (0.072)
***  0.427 (0.051)
***  0.314 (0.085)
***  0.512 (0.060)
*** 
Indicators individual Pay 





   Personal bonus  -0.026 (0.027)  -0.052 (0.035)  -0.035 (0.031)  -0.069 (0.035)
** 
   Tariffs and 
   Provisions  -0.110 (0.034)
***  -0.114 (0.032)
***  -0.106 (0.036)
***  -0.111 (0.032)
***   26 
   Shift allowance  -0.034 (0.016)
**  -0.070 (0.017)
***  -0.045 (0.020)
**  -0.060  (0.020)
*** 
   Inconvenience  
   Allowance  -0.133 (0.027)
***  -0.165 (0.026)
***  -0.152 (0.030)
***  -0.166 (0.027)
*** 
   Wage in kind  -0.099 (0.059)
*  -0.052 (0.045)  -0.058 (0.077)  -0.043 (0.052) 
   Extra payment  
   collective agreement  0.057 (0.025)
**  -0.036 (0.017)
**  0.093 (0.025)
***  0.009 (0.021) 
   Profit sharing  0.021 (0.030)  0.007 (0.026)  0.001 (0.031)  0.007 (0.027) 
   Other extra 
   Payments  0.001 (0.022)  0.001 (0.017)  0.015 (0.026)  0.010 (0.018) 
Indicator 2001  0.002 (0.023)  -0.004 (0.011)  0.015 (0.026)  0.006 (0.013) 








  0.337  0.145  0.403  0.127 
(Pseudo) R-squared
   0.147  0.195  0.139  0.227 
Number of explanatory 
variables  63  80  63  80 
Number of hirees  15,422  15,422  9,699  9,699 
Number of firms  1,711  1,711  1,578  1,578 
a)  Fixed firm-specific effect; Newey-West clustered standard errors in parentheses.  
b)  Random firm-specific effect. Marginal effects at averages of explanatory variables; Standard 
errors in parentheses. 
c)  Based on averages of incumbents at t-1, so that it may differ across years for the panel firms.                     
For joint hypotheses the F-statistic (for random effects: Chi-square statistic) is presented. The 
number of restrictions under the null is mentioned behind the explanatory variable. 
d)  Reference group: J1. 
e)  Category 7 includes job levels 7 and 8. 
f)  Reference group: technical. 
*)  Statistically significantly different from zero at the 10-percent level; **) at the 5-percent level; 
***) at the 1-percent level.  27 
Table 7 – Estimates of equation (6) for all hirees; dependent variable: Indicator 
female hiree
a) 
  LPM 
Fixed effects
b)  Probit, random effects
c) 
Job mass below,
k J ￿ d), e)  (6)  0.94  -  21.55
**  - 
    Layer = 2  0.031 (0.153)  -  -0.100 (0.128)  - 
    Layer = 3  -0.071 (0.066)  -  -0.102 (0.060)
*  - 
    Layer = 4  -0.082 (0.047)
*  -  -0.146 (0.053)
 ***  - 
    Layer = 5  -0.063 (0.040)  -  -0.128 (0.042)
 ***  - 
    Layer = 6  -0.069 (0.060)  -  -0.186 (0.063)
 ***  - 
    Layer = 7,8  -0.010 (0.166)  -  -0.181 (0.155)  - 
Job mass below,
k J ￿ d), e)  (6)  -  0.82  -  22.90
*** 
Firm’s highest layer
 = 2  -  -0.004 (0.103)  -  -0.075 (0.130) 
Firm’s highest layer = 3  -  0.010 (0.100)  -  0.001 (0.092) 
Firm’s highest layer = 4  -  -0.102 (0.071)  -  -0.136 (0.064)
 ** 
Firm’s highest layer = 5  -  -0.044 (0.038)  -  -0.107 (0.040)
 *** 
Firm’s Highest layer = 6  -  -0.060 (0.031)
*  -  -0.142 (0.032)
 *** 
Firm’s Highest layer = 7,8  -  -0.051 (0.039)  -  -0.095 (0.037)
 *** 
Indicators individual  
job level





    J2  -0.055 (0.033)
*  -0.050 (0.031)  -0.048 (0.024)
**  -0.049 (0.023)
** 
    J3  -0.062 (0.034)
*  -0.065 (0.032)
**  -0.079 (0.024)
 ***  -0.080 (0.023)
 *** 
    J4  -0.151 (0.037)
 ***  -0.159 (0.034)
***  -0.180 (0.024)
 ***  -0.188 (0.021)
 *** 
    J5  -0.202 (0.040)
 ***  -0.208 (0.037)
***  -0.215 (0.025)
 ***  -0.223 (0.022)
 *** 
    J6  -0.274 (0.058)
 ***  -0.288 (0.043)
***  -0.223 (0.035)
 ***  -0.258 (0.021)
 *** 
    J7
 g)  -0.330 (0.154)
 **  -0.303 (0.051)
***  -0.210 (0.081)
 ***  -0.255 (0.022)
 *** 








  0.336  0.336  0.145  0.147 
(Pseudo) R-squared
   0.148  0.148  0.195  0.195 
Number of explanatory 
variables  68  68  85  85 
a)  15,422 workers; 1,711 firms. All further variables are unreported, as they do not differ appreciably 
from the first and second column of Table 6. 
b)  Fixed firm-specific effect; Newey-West clustered standard errors in parentheses.  
c)  Random firm-specific effect. Marginal effects at averages of explanatory variables; Standard errors 
in parentheses. 
d)  For joint hypotheses the F-statistic (for random effects: Chi-square statistic) is presented. The 




k k J J J J
−
≡ + + + ￿ . 
f)  Reference group: J1. 
g)  Category 7 includes job levels 7 and 8. 
*)    Statistically significantly different from zero at the 10-percent level; **) at the 5-percent level; 
***) at the 1-percent level. 